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I. Introduction 
Ever since the "minjmum contacts" analysis of International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington! supplanted the pure territorial theory of 
personal jurisdiction embodied in Pennoyer v. Neff, 2 the Supreme 
Court's jurisdictional decisions have been marked by inconsistencies 
and theoretical vagaries. For example, the Court has alternatively' 
emphasized and undermined the role of state sovereignty in the due 
process calculus of personal jurisdiction;3 wavered in the impor-
tance it has attached to the concept of "'purposeful availment" of the 
benefits of a particular forum state's laws;4 and sought unsuccess-
l. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
3. Compare, e.g., World-WIde Volkswagen CoIp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 
(1980) [hereinafter World-W"ufe Volbwagen) (due process clause "acts to ensure that the 
States through their COUItS do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their 
stanJs as coequal sovereigns in a federal system") and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
251 (1958) [hereinafter Hanson) (due process limitations on state court exercise of personal 
jurisdiction Uare a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective 
States") with Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694, 702 n.l0 (1982) (UIt is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal 
jurisdiction. as applied to state COUItS, reflects an element of federalism and the character 
of state sovereignty vis-a-vis cdler States • . . the restriction on state power descnDed in 
World-W"ule Volbwagen Corp., however, must be seen ultimately as a function of the indi-
vidual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. ") and Phillips Petroleum 
CoIp. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (due process limitations of personal jurisdiction 
" 'rqnesentll a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter 
of individualIiberty.' "). 
For discussions of the Supreme Court's varied views on the role of state sovereignty 
in personal jurisdiction doctrine,see generaJ1y Bearry v. Beech Aircraft COIp., 818 F.2d 
370, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1987); R. CASAD, JL"RlSDICTlON IS ClW. Acnoss § 2.05 (1983 and 
1986 Supp.); Gottlieb, In Search of the link Between ~ Process and Jurisdiction, 60 
WASH. U.L.Q. 1291 (1983); Jay, "MinimJun Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal 
Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429 (1983); Lewis, The Three Deaths of 
"State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 58 NOTIIE DAME L. REv. 699 (1983): Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and 
pusonaJ Jurisdiaion: A 17r.wreticaI Evahuztion, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (981); 
SeideIson, Reazsting World-Wufe Volkswagen as a Source of Longer Jurisdictional Reach, 
19 TLLSA L.J. 1 (1983); Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the I.m\' of 
PusonaJ Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REv. 689 (1987); Weintraub, Due Process limitations 
on the Personal JIl1isdiction of Stale Couns: Tune for Change, 63 OR. L. REv. 485 
(1984); Whitten, ~ Constitutional l.irniJations on Stale Coun Jurisdiction: A Historian-
Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Failh and Credit and Due Process Clauses (pan 2), 
14 CREIGKION L. REv. 735, 846 (1981). 
4. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) [hereinafter 
Burger King) (treating purposeful avaiIment as a means to allocate the burden of persuasion 
on the question of whedler a court's assertion of jurisdiction would be fair); World-Wufe 
Voi.tslmgen. (treating purposeful avaiIment as a means to define "contacts" relevant to the 
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fully to distinguish between the "mere" foreseeability that a per-
son's conduct may cause injury in a particular jurisdiction (which 
the Court has said is an insufficient basis for asserting personal 
jurisdiction), S and the foreseeability of "being haled into court 
there" (which it has said is sufficient). 6 Thus, the Court's personal 
jurisdiction decisions ultimately take on a distinctive savor of ad hoc 
decisionmaking and lend little principled guidance to the lower 
courts. 
In Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court, 7 the Court 
recently had the opportunity to clarify some of the ambiguities sur-
rounding personal jurisdiction doctrine. The case presented a criti-
cal issue that has divided the lower courts: whether and to what 
extent a defendant whose product makes its way into a state via the 
"stream of commerce" is subject to suit in the courts of that state. 8 
The stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction posits that 
a defendant who markets an article in such a way that it can be 
expected to be carried through the stream of commerce into a 
remote jurisdiction can be subjected to suit in that jurisdiction if the 
product causes injury there. Unfortunately, the three opinions ren-
dered in Asahi not only fail to resolve this question, but also renew 
minimum contacts analysis); Hanson, (treating purposeful availment as dispositive factor in 
determining whether state court assertion of jurisdiction exceeds territorial limitations). 
For discussions of the purposeful availment requirement, see generally R. CASAD. 
supra note 3, at §§ 2.02[4][e], 2.04[2][e][ii], 2.05, 2.07, 7.02[2]; Gottlieb, supra note 3, 
at 1294-1303; Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts ReapplUd: Mr. Justice Brennan Has it 
His Way in Burger King Corp: v. Rutize.,.,-ic;z, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585; Stein, supra note 
3, at 735-38: Note, Constitutional Limitarions on Stare Long Ann Jurisdiction, 49 l:. CHI. 
L. REv. 156, 170-72 (1982). 
5. World-Wide Vo/k.s'd.'CZgen, 444 U.S. at 295-96. 
6. Id. at 297. 
7. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). 
8. See. e.g., Max Daetv.'Yler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 19851 (reject-
ing theory): Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) 
(rejecting theory): Noel Y. S. S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1982) (accepting 
theory); Wiles v. Morita Iron Works, S04 N.E.2d 942 (TIl. 1987) (accepting theory); 
Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 508 A.2d 1127 (N.J. 1986) (accepting 
theory); Kawasaki Steel Corp. Y. Middleton, 669 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985) (accepting 
theory). 
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court [hereinafter Asalul also presented a second 
troublesome question: whether an alien defendant is entitled to more, less. or the same 
level of protection from state coun assertions of jurisdiction than similarly situated 
domestic defendants. The Court ultimately resolved the case on grounds that implicitly 
considered, but did not expressly depend. on the defendant's status as an alien (Japanese) 
corporation. 
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old ones about the conceptual foundations underlying the law of per-
sonal jurisdiction. 
This article evaluates the stream of commerce theory of per-
sonal jurisdiction in light of existing precedent and the constitutional 
imperative of due process. Part II briefly describes the factual 
background of Asahi and the various opinions rendered in the case. 
Part m outlines the development of jurisdictional doctrine since 
International Shoe, emphasizing the meaning of "purposeful avail: 
ment" and its fluid role in the due process equation governing state 
court jurisdiction. Part IV then traces the evolution of the stream of 
commerce theory since International Shoe. Part V examines and 
rejects criticisms of the stream of commerce theory, and concludes 
that under any reasonabre interpretation of the due process parame-
ters on jurisdiction, the stream of commerce theory as it is .ordinar-
ily used-as a justification for specific jurisdiction-ought to survive 
constitutional scrutiny. Therefore, any defendant who knows or 
should know that a product he markets will be used and may cause 
injury in a foreign jurisdiction should be amenable, as a consti-
tutional matter, to suit there in a cause of action related to the prod-
uct. To the extent that the plaintiffs chosen forum is truly an 
inconvenient one, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is available 
to relieve the defendant of any onerous litigation burdens. 
II. Uncertain Implications for the Stream of Commerce Theory 
of Personal Jurisdiction 
A. Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court 
1he Asall; case arose out of a motorcycle accident involving two 
California residents, one of whom was killed. The surviving acci-
dent victim brought a products liability action in a California state 
court alleging that the accident was caused by defects in the motor-
cycle's tire, tube, or sealant. He named as defendants Sterling May 
Co., the California retailer, and Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., 
the Taiwanese manufacturer of the motorcycle tire. 
Cheng Shin impleaded and sought indemnity from Asahi Metal 
Industries, a major Japanese concern that had manufactured the 
tube's valve assembly. 9 Eventually, the plaintiff settled his claims 
9. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Coon, 39 Cal. 3d 35,41,702 P.2d 543, 544, 216 
Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (1985). 
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against the original defendants. Cheng Shin's claim ag!linst Asahi 
for indemnity, as well as several other indemnity claims among the 
direct defendants, remained. 
Asahi sought dismissal of Cheng Shin's indemnity action on the 
ground that the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. 
Asahi was a major Japanese producer and exporter of tire valve 
assemblies whose product was incorporated into motorcycle tires 
sold around the world. Although Asahi had never sold its valves 
directly to California companies, for ten years it had regularly sold 
valves to Cheng Shin for incorporation into the latter's motorcycle 
tires, and some of these tires were in turn regularly sold to the Cali-
fornia manufacturer of the motorcycle involved in the accident. 10 
The California Court of Appeals held that assertion of jurisdiction 
under the California long arm statute would be unconstitutional,11 
but the California Supreme Court reversed. 12 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed. Justice O'Connor cast the issue in the case as whether 
the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the 
components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the 
United States would reach the forum state in the stream of com-
merce constitutes "minimum contacts" ... such that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction "does not offend "traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.' "13 
But the issue was not whether "mere awareness" constitutes "mini-
mum contacts." Asahi's. relevant contacts with California were that 
its products were sold and allegedly caused injury there. The issue 
was whether specific jurisdiction might properly be based on con-
tacts of this nature. 14 
10. [d. at 41, 7m P.2d at 545,216 Cal. Rptr. at 387. 
11. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Coun, 147 Cal. App. 3d 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. 741 
(1983) (granting petition for writ of mandamus qnashing service of process), rev'd, 39 Cal. 
3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985). 
12. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Coun, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 7m P.2d 543,216 Cal. Rptr. 
385 (1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). 
13. Asaro, 107 S. Ct. 1026. 1029 (citations omitted). 
14. [d. at 1033. "Specific" personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant's contacts 
with the forum state arise out of or are related to the cause of action. "General" persooal 
jurisdiction exists when the defendant's contacts with the forum state do not arise out of or 
are unrelated to the cause of action. Generally speaking, coons demand a higher quality 
and quantity of contacts to suppon an assertion of general jurisdiction than of specific 
jurisdiction. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
414-16 & nn.8-9 (l984) [hereinafter Helicopreros]: Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts 
(ft'er Non-residents in Our Federal System, 43 COR.'"ELL L.Q. 196 (1957) (introducing con-
cept of general and isolated contact jurisdiction); yon Mehren & Traunnan, Jurisdiction 10 
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The opinions in the case create new uncertainties in the law of 
personal jurisdiction. Although all nine justices concurred in the 
judgment of reversal, the three separate opinions filed in the case 
reveal a deep schism in the Court concerning the meaning and role 
of purposeful availment, particularly in the stream of commerce 
context. 
Justice O'Connor's opinion can effectively be viewed as two 
separate opinions-Part IT.A., which addresses the stream of com:' 
merce/purposeful availment issue, and in which only three other 
justices joined, and Part IT.B., which deals with the international 
aspects of the case, and in which all members of the Court except 
Iustice Scalia joined. This article is concerned principally with the 
potential impact of Part"IT.A. In Part IT.A., four members of the 
Court in effect concluded that the stream of commerce theory of 
personal jurisdiction could not survive constitutional scrutiny. Spe-
cifically, the O'Connor plurality took the position that a defendant 
who knows that its product will make its way into a jurisdiction via 
the stream of commerce has nevertheless not purposefully directed 
its activities toward that jurisdiction. Under the O'Connor plural-
ity's view, some level of purposeful activity is a prerequisite to 
amenability to suit, and Asahi' s contacts with California were not in 
fact purposeful. Thus, these four justices strongly suggest that the 
stream of commerce theory is fundamentally flawed, and that asser-
tions of jurisdiction based on that theory are unconstitutional. IS 
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, four justices indicated their 
support of the stream of commerce theory: "The stream of com-
merce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the 
regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to dis-
tribution to retail sale. "16 In Iustice Brennan's view, a defendant 
who has engaged in a marketing scheme that makes use of these 
"eddies and streams," knowing that his product is being sold in a 
remote jurisdiction, has notice of the possibility of suit there. A 
defendant's act of placing his product in the stream of commerce 
satisfies any threshold requirement of purposeful conduct. At fust 
blush, the Brennan plurality opinion, in which Justices White, Mar-
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 liAR\". L. 1tE\ .. 1121. 1136-63 11966,. The e:'(tent 
to which contacts may be "related to" a cause of action even though they do not ··arise 
out of" it and whether this is a distinction without a difference. are unclear. See 
Helicopreros. 466 U.S. at 415 n.10; id. at 426-27 (Brennan. 1 .. dissenting). 
15. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033. 
16. 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan. 1 .. concurring in pan and in judgment/. 
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shall, and Blackmun joined, appears to ensure that at least four 
members of the Court would uphold the theory. But Justices White 
and Blackmun also joined in Justice Stevens' somewhat confusing 
opinion; consequently, these two justices' views on the issue are not 
completely clear. 
Justice Stevens suggests, first, that the Court should not have 
addressed the purposeful availment question at all, and second, that 
the Validity of the stream of commerce theory in a particular case 
depends on several quantitative factors that were probably, though 
not definitely, present in Asahi. 17 As noted, it is difficult to know 
the extent to which other members of the Court share Justice 
Stevens' views, because Justices White and Blackmun, who pur-
ported to join Justice Brennan's opinion, also concurred in this 
opinion. 
B. Fallout from Asahi 
The lower courts have variously interpreted the fragmented 
Asahi decision as it relates to the stream of commerce question. 
Some courts appear to view the case as sounding the death knell for 
the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction. In Sol-
linger v. Nasca International, Inc., 18 a copyright infringement case, 
the Vermont district court implied that Asahi would preclude basing 
jurisdiction on the defendant's act of placing its infringing products 
into the stream of comnierce, but upheld the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction on other grounds. Similarly, in Witbeck v. Bill Cody's 
Ranch Inn,19 the Supreme Court of Michigan viewed Asahi as con-
sistent with that court's own prior decisions rejecting the stream of 
commerce theory as a basis for asserting jurisdiction. 
Conversely, the Texas Supreme Court in Keen v. Ashot Ash-
kelon, Ltd. ,20 simply ignored Asahi's pronouncements on this sub-
ject, relying on earlier decisions of the Court that can be read to 
endorse the stream of commerce theory as a legitimate basis for 
upholding an assertion of jurisdiction. 
Some courts have sought to avoid the potential implications of 
Asahi by limiting the decision to the facts of that particular case. 
17. ld. at 1038. (Stevens. 1 .• concurring in part and in judgment). 
18. 655 F. supp. 1385. 1388-89 ro. Vt. 1987). 
19. 428 Mich. 659. 411 ~.W.2d 439 (1987). 
10. 748 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1988), 
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Thus, in Dittman v. Code-a-Phone Corp., 21 an Indiana district court 
asserted that "a major distinction" can be drawn between a manu-
facturer of component parts whose product is incorporated into 
another's and sold in remote jurisdictions, as in Asahi, and a manu-
facturer who sells finished products to an intermediate distributor 
who, in tum, markets those products abroad. 22 And in McBead 
Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd., 23 the Louisiana Supreme Court did 
not view Asahi as dispositive of the stream of commerce theory 
because the case involved an alien defendant seeking indemnity 
from another alien defendant in a domestic forum. In Asahi, the 
Louisiana court reasoned, there was "clearly an insufficient rela-
tionship among the California forum, the Japanese corporate defen-
dant, and the litigation of the indemnity issue. "24 
Finally, many courts have simply acknowledged Asahi~s ambi-
guity concerning the Validity of the stream of commerce theory. 25 
They cite the decision's lack of a majority opinion on the subject, as 
well as its potential inconsistency with some of the Court's prior 
decisions, as a basis for concluding, as did one Michigan district 
court, that Asahi "reflects the debate, both among the Justices and 
the circuits, over what exactly constitutes minimum contacts via the 
stream of commerce. "26 
As these cases demonstrate, Asahi leaves a major gap in the law 
of personal jurisdiction. The only certainty is that the present Court 
is deeply divided over the scope and Validity of the stream of com-
merce theory. This division appears to stem from more fundamen-
tal disputes concerning the meaning of "purposeful availment," its 
role in detennining the appropriateness of jurisdiction, and whether 
federalism concerns ought to continue to influence jurisdictional 
doctrine. The three Asahi opinions will undoubtedly continue to be 
the basis of much judicial speculation as to the Court's future treat-
ment of stream of commerce cases. The remainder of this article 
will trace the development of the purposeful availment requirement, 
21. 666 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Ind. 1987). 
22. See also Hall v. Zambelli, 669 F. Supp. 753. 757 (S.D. W. Va. 1987) (Asahi 
involved manufacturer of component part rather than manufacturer of finished product 
distributed throughout United States through domestic distnOutor). 
23. 509 So. 2d 429 (La. 1987). 
24. [d. at 433 n.7. 
15. E.g .• Hall v. Zambelli, 669 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. W. Va. 1987): Ag-Chem Equip. 
Co. v. Avec Corp .. 666 F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Mich. 1987 ): Poole and Kent Co. \'. 
Equilease Assoc .. 71 Md. App. 9. 523 A.2d 1018 (987). 
26. Ag-Chem Equip. Co. v. Avco Corp., 666 F. Supp. at 1014. 
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outline the history of the stream of commerce theory. and evaluate 
the various views represented in Asahi in light of the Coun's 
previously articulated jurisdictional doctrine. 
m. The Concept of "Purposeful Availment" 
A. Minimum Contacts Theory and the Origins of the Purposeful 
Availment Requirement 
Before 1945, in deference to due process, the U.S. Supreme 
Conn had consistently held that a conn could not assert nonCOD-
sensual27 personal jurisdiction over a person or thing that was not 
physically present within its jurisdiction. This territorial theory of 
jurisdiction treated each state as an independent sovereign whose 
authority to legislate and adjudicate did not extend beyond its bor-
ders. 28 As American society became more complex and mobile, the 
27. Even under the territorial model of personal jurisdiction of Penrwyer l·. Neff 
[hereinafter Pennoyer), a defendant cooId consent to a state COIll1's assertion of jurisdic-
tion. See generally J. FRlEDE>1HAL, M. KA.. . "E, A.'1> A. Mn.t.et, CI\-1L PRocEnt.1tE § 3.5 
(1985). State coons and legislatures in the post·Pennoyer, pre-Imemational Shoe era used 
the consent theory as a means of circumventing the limitations of the territorial approach 
related to physical presence. St.atDtes requiring corporations to consent to senice of pro-
cess within the fmum state as a condition of doing business became rommonplace. as did 
nonresident mororist Sfittlltes that implied consent to suit by anyooe driving a motor vehicle 
within the state. A coosent theory is difficult to justify, of course, if personal jurisdiction 
rules exist to proteet state sovereignty; a priVaIe litigant should not be able unilaterally to 
waive one state's objection to another state's judicial overreaching. Despite this fundamen-
tal defect in the ron.sent theory, the Supreme Coon routinely upheld state coon assertions 
of personal jurisdiction that coIild be characterized as coo.sensual under express or implied 
ron.sent statutes. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (upholding nonresident 
motorist statute creating implied consent to be sued); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 G.S. 350 
(1882) (upholding state statute requiring corporation's consent to service of process as a 
rondition of doing business \\ithin the state). 
For oWer criticisms of the consent theory. see Stein, supra DOte 3, at 696: Kurland. 
The 5JqJreme Court, the Due Process Cltmse and the In Personam JUrisdictiOfl of Slate 
Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569. 575-82 (1958). 
28. The territorial theory of jurisdiction arose from POl1wyer, 95 U.S. 714, 722 
(1877), and was purponedly based on "well establi.sbed principles of [international] law:' 
Id. at 722. Justice Field relied on a Jeading nineteenth cennuy treatise on internationa.l 
law, J. STORY, CoMME.'>'TARIESOSlHECOSFUCTOFUWS. FOREJGSA.'1)~ (1834 ed. and 
photo reprint 1972) [hereinafter CoMME.'>'TAIUES]. The principles from which Justice Field 
seems to derive an absolute prescription against extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction are 
two of the three maxims set forth in Story's great treatise. But Story's third maxim pro-
\-ided that the laws of one coonny may have an effect in another through the express or 
tacit consent of the other coont:ry. Story realized that an effective inIematiooal system 
requires sovereign states to recognize the laws of odler governments if the interests of that 
state are not thereby prejudiced: 
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limitations of the strict territorial theory became increasingly appar-
ent. Courts and legislatures developed elaborate fictions to bring 
intuitively reasonable assertions of in personam jurisdiction within 
its parameters.29 
In the 1945 case International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the 
Supreme Court partially· abandoned the pretenses of the territorial 
theory in favor of a "flexible" approach intended to ensure fairness 
to defendants called to court. The Court said there that "due proc': 
ess requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment 
in personam ... he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.' "30 Among the relevant considera-
tions as to whether this· constitutional standard was met were the 
extent of the inconvenience of defending in a remote forum, .whether 
the defendant's "contacts" with the forum were continuous and sys-
The true foundation, on which the administration of international law must rest, 
is, that the rules, which are to govern, are those, which arise from mutual in-
terest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences, which would result from 
a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order 
that justice may be done to us in return. 
CoMMENTARIES, at 34 (emphasiS added). 
Story's view of the role of comity between sovereigns was thus pragmatic. Although 
international law certainly did not compel a country to recognize the laws of a foreign 
state, Story did not believe that it prohibited a country from doing so. COMMa"TAPJES, at 
24. Moreover, Story expressly acknowledged that the principle of comity was also broad 
enough to encompass the recognition of foreign judgments. Id. at 452. Field's basic 
premise in Pennoyer was thus arguably erroneous. Moreover, as Professor Kurland has 
observed, Story dealt with conflicts of law at the international level; "[t]hese doctrines 
were borrowed from laws relating to wholly independent sovereignties which were not 
relevant to jurisdictions joined in a federation." Kurland, supra note 27, at 585. 
29. The fictions associated with the consent theory of personal jurisdiction are one 
example of how states attempted to circumvent Penn oyer's limiting principles. See supra 
note 27. Courts dealt with the special problem of corporations in yet another way: by 
reasoning that a corporation was "present," and therefore was subject to suit, wherever it 
was "doing business." This "doing business" inquiry "soon substituted that shibboleth 
for any theory. Without looking back of the words, the courts held that jurisdiction existed 
if the corporate defendant was 'doing business' within the jurisdiction but no jurisdiction 
existed if it were not 'doing business.'" Kurland, supra note 27, at 585. Although Inter-
national Shoe bad generally been perceived as replacing the "doing business" test for per-
sonal jurisdiction with minimum contacts analysis, the Court recently appeared to revive 
the doctrine in Helicopteros when it relied heavily on an ancient "doing business" case, 
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.s. 516 (1923), as justification for 
denying the Texas courts power to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant 
having limited contacts with Texas. See R. CASAD, supra note 3, at § 2.04[2][e][viii] 
(Supp. 1986). Subpart II.A. of Justice O'Connor's AsaJ-J opinion, as well as Justice 
Stevens' opinion, contains language reminiscent of the "doing business" line of cases. 
30. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940». 
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tematic (as opposed to isolated or sporadic), whether the plaintiffs 
cause of action was related to the defendant's contacts with the 
forum, and whether the defendant had received the benefits and pro-
tection of the laws of the state. 31 
International Shoe represented a major departure from pure ter-
ritorial jurisdictional analysis in favor of one based primarily on 
"fairness" or "reasonableness." The Court made no effort to 
defme the concept of "contacts." Presumably, any nexus between 
the defendant's activities and the forum state constituted a "con-
tact" for purposes of minimum contacts analysis. 32 
The Court's next jurisdictional decision, McGee v. International 
life Insurance Co., 33 resolved a question that had divided the lower 
courts: whether a single contact was sufficient to support jurisdic-
tion.34 McGee was significant largely because it made clear that 
specific jurisdiction could be based on an isolated contact.3S It left 
intact the jurisdictional analysis set out in International Shoe. 
31. ld. at 317-19. 
32. In the years following International Shoe, courts developed classes of cases in 
which jurisdiction was almost automatically treated as "fair" or "unfair." Where a 
defendant's contacts were "continuous and systematic" and the plaintiff's cause of action 
was related to them, the exercise of jurisdiction was considered consistent with the due 
process clause. Where the contacts were more isolated and the cause of action unrelated, 
jurisdiction was generally deemed inappropriate. See generally Donahue v. Far Eastern 
Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and cases cited therein. For 
discussions of the early post-International Shoe cases, see generally Kurland, supra note 
27, at 593-611; Note, The Growth oime International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 
523 (1949). 
33. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
34. See Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 573, 80 A.2d 664, 666 
(1951) (citation omitted): 
We are of the opinion that the United States Supreme Court has left undecided 
whether isolated tortious activity could result in a proper subjection of a foreign 
corporation to suit in the forum when the cause of action arose out of that ac-
tivity; no generally applicable standards can be ascertained from the decisions 
beyond the International Shoe case • • • The American Law Instinue indi<:ates 
that the issue is open as of 1948. 
Sm)1h upheld single act, specific jurisdiction. Id. at 575-77, 80 A.2d at 669. BU1 see 
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502,505 (4th Cir. 1956); Note, 
supra note 32, at 530-31 (suggesting that courts generally are reluctant to assert jurisdiction 
based on continuous and substantial operations if the cause of action is not related to the 
operations). 
35. "[Al fair interpretation of McGee is that jurisdiction over a nonresident is per-
missible whenever he voluntarily performs a single act within the forum, provided, of 
course, that the asserted cause of action is related to the single act upon which jurisdiction 
is predicated." Note, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Prod-
uct Liability Actions, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1028, 1030 (1965). 
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The basic formula for testing state court in personam jurisdic-
tion thus remained unchanged until the Court's 1958 decision in 
Hanson v. Denckla.36 In Hanson, the Court refined the meaning of 
"minimum contacts," holding that only those contacts resulting 
from the defendant's ""purposeful availment" of the forum state's 
legal and procedural benefits were relevant to minimum contacts 
analysis.37 This definition significantly altered International Shoe's 
approach, which viewed whether or not the defendant had benefitted 
from the forum state's laws as but one relevant factor. 
The case involved a Delaware bank acting as trustee for a set-
tlor who had moved from Pennsylvania to Florida. The settlor con-
tinued her communications with the bank from Florida until her 
death. The final administration of the trust led to two lawsuits 
involving the bank, the first in Florida and the second in Dela-
ware. The bank failed to appear in the Florida suit and the Florida 
court entered judgment against it. The Delaware court, however, 
entered a judgment inconsistent with the Florida court's judgment, 
accepting the argument that the Florida court had lacked jurisdiction 
over the bank in the prior proceedings. On appeal, the plaintiffs 
from the Florida lawsuit demanded that the Florida judgment be 
reinstated. 38 
Applying its refined minimum contacts test, the Court found 
that the requisite purposeful availment of Florida's laws was lacking 
because the bank's contacts with Florida had resulted exclusively 
from the settlor's unilateral act of moving to Florida and directing 
the bank, from Florida, to take certain actions concerning the trust. 
Accordingly, it held that the Florida judgment was invalid. 39 
Hanson's treatment of the purposeful availment question has 
proven problematic because the Court did not clearly articulate what 
it meant by purposeful availment. The Court insisted that the mini-
mum contacts test was grounded in ""territorial limitations on the 
power of the respective States,"4{) suggesttng implicitly that the 
requirement of purposeful availment ensured iliat a state would not 
exceed the scope of its sovereign authority . Yet it did not really 
36. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
37. Ill. at 253. 
38. Ill. at 242. 
39. Ill. at 252. 
40. Ill. at 251. 
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explain how purposeful availment is related to sovereignty, and it is 
difficult to see the purported link between these two concepts. 41 
Whatever the explanation for this linkage, Hanson made clear 
that International Shoe should not be construed as a complete repu-
diation of the sovereignty-based, territorial theory of jurisdiction. 
This insistence that the due process limitations on personal juris-
diction embody sovereignty concerns is the primary source of the 
theoretical inconsistencies in the Court's more recent personal juris-
diction decisions. Indeed, it appears to be at the heart of the 
justices' dispute in Asahi over the Validity of the stream of com-
merce theory. The remainder of this part discusses what in a sense 
is the key to resolving the question of the validity of the stream of 
commerce theory: the meaning and role of purposeful availment. 
B. The Meaning of Purposeful Availment 
For nearly two decades after Hanson, the Court paid scant 
attention to how the jurisdictional principles developed in Interna-
tional Shoe, McGee, and Hanson, were playing out in state and 
lower federal courts. 42 Over the past eleven years, however, the 
Court has exhibited a renewed interest in personal jurisdiction doc-
trine. Several cases decided during this period involved claims that 
specific conduct did not amount to purposeful avai1ment within the 
meaning of Hanson. 
The first case after Hanson to present the purposeful availment 
issue was Shaffer v. Heitner, decided in 1977.43 In Shaffer, a share-
holder derivative suit· brought in Delaware against officers and 
directors of a Delaware corporation, the Supreme Court rejected a 
simplistic territorial approach to quasi in rem jurisdiction, holding 
that all assertions of personal jurisdiction, whether in personam, in 
41. One explanation is that the purposeful availment creates a reciprocity between the 
state and the defendant that justifies the state court's assertion of jurisdiction over the 
defendant. That is, a defendant who has deliberately taken advantage of some aspects of 
a state's sovereign powers, as by engaging in business activities within the state that are 
expressly regnIated and protected by the statutes of the state, should not complain when 
anodler of those powers (i.e. the power to adjudicate) is exerted against it. 
42. HIn the d~ following [ITl1emationaI Shoe, McGee, and Hanson] the Supreme 
Coon routinely denied petitions for certiorari in jurisdictional cases, leaving the states free 
to experiment with long-arm legislation." Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United 
Stales and in the European Communities: If ComparisOn, 82 MIcH. L. lID'. 1195, 1199 
(1984). 
43. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
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rem, or quasi in rem, are subject to minimum contacts analysis. 
The Court then went on to consider whether the defendants' contacts 
with the forum state were constitutionally sufficient to support juris-
diction. 
Unfortunately, the Court's consideration of the purposeful 
availment issue was cursory, offering virtually no guidance as to the 
meaning of the concept. The plaintiff contended that because Dela-
ware law provided substantial benefits to the defendants, it waS 
"only fair and just" that they be amenable to suit there. The Court 
found this unpersuasive, on the ground that the defendants had "had 
nothing to do with the State of Delaware" and "had no reason to 
expect to be haled before a Delaware court. "44 
This reasoning is implausible. Each of the defendants had pur-
chased shares of stock in the corporation, the situs of which was 
Delaware under Delaware law. This is "having something to do 
with Delaware"-that is, contact with the state-if only in a meta-
physical sense. Moreover, one wonders where corporate fiduciaries 
of a Delaware corporation would expect to be sued for breach of 
duty in a derivative suit if not in Delaware.4S Shaffer obviously did 
little to clarify what sort of conduct would meet the threshold 
requirement of purposeful contacts with a state. 
Kulko v. Superior Court,46 decided the following year, similarly 
failed to articulate a clear definition of purposeful availment. In 
Kulko. a California resident sought modification in a California state 
court of the child custody and child support provisions of a Haitian 
divorce decree. The defendant's only "contact" with the state was 
that he allowed his daughter to live there with her mother despite the 
terms of the divorce decree giving him custody during the school 
year. 
The Supreme Court agreed that California could not constitu-
tionally assert jurisdiction against the father based on his "ac-
quiesence" to his daughter's desire to live in California. "A father 
who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his children's 
preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California than 
was required under a separation agreement can hardly be said to 
44. [d. at 216. 
45. Compare Weintraub, supra note 3, at 493 (footnote omitted) ("It is fair to compel 
directors to respond to a stockholders' derivative suit in the state of incorporation ... they 
could 'reasonably anticipate being haled into court there' to account for their actions. "). 
46. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
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have 'purposefully availed himself of the 'benefits and protections' 
of California's laws. "47 The Court emphasized that the defendant 
had not obtained any benefits from California. The Court attributed 
any fmancial "benefits" to the father resulting from his daughter's 
decision to live in California to her absence from New York, where 
the father lived, and to the mother's failure to initiate a support 
modification proceeding in New York. 
Although the result in Kulko seems intuitively correct, it is dif-
ficult to articulate why the father's contacts with California did not 
result from purposeful conduct on his part. Unlike the bank in Han-
son, which had played no part in the settlor's decision to move to 
Florida and could not have prevented the move, the father in Xulleo 
did have the ability to prevent his child from moving to California. 
He had chosen not to do so in the interest of family harmony. In 
this sense, at least, his contacts with California can be viewed as 
resulting from his own purposeful acts. 
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood5on,48 a 1980 five-to-
four decision, the Court held that the defendant, an automobile 
retailer in New York, had not purposefully availed itself of the 
benefits of Oklahoma law by selling a vehicle to persons who later 
travelled through that state. The majority likened the consumer's 
"unilateral" act of driving an automobile through a remote jurisdic-
tion to the "unilateral" activity involved in Hanson. 
The Court illustrated its conception of the meaning of purpose-
ful contacts by contrasting the • 'isolated occurrence" involved in the 
case with one in which a defendant has "delivered its products into 
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they "Kill be pur-
chased by consumers in the forum state. "49 The point seemed to be 
that when a defendant's activities make contacts with a particular 
jurisdiction very likely, contacts that arise may be considered pur-
poseful within the meaning of Hanson. World-Wide Volkswagen 
thus appeared to resolve the question of purposefulness in terms of 
a defendant's reasonable expectations. 
In Calder v. Jones,so a case with facts analogous in some ways 
to Asahi's, the Court considered whether jurisdiction could be based 
on contacts created by distribution decisions of a third party. The 
47. Id. at 94. 
48. World-Wule Volkswagen. 444 C.S. 286 (1980). 
49. Id. at 298 (emphasis added). 
SO. 465 C.S. 783 (984). 
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defendants were the author and the editor of an allegedly libelous 
story published in the National Enquirer. The alleged defamatory 
statements concerned a California resident. The defendants argued 
that because they had no control over where the magazine was dis-
tributed-that decision was made by the publishers-it was unfair to 
hold them accountable in California based on the fact that the 
Enquirer was widely circulated there. 
The Court summarily rejected this argument, observing that the 
defendants clearly knew their out-of-state actions would have a "p0-
tentially devastating" effect in California. Although the Court 
never expressly discussed the concept of "purposeful availment" in 
Calder, the appellant briefed the issue,51 and the case must logically 
be viewed as being partially concerned with the meaning of that 
phrase. 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,52 decided in 1985, was the 
Supreme Court's last major jurisdictional decision before Asahi. 
The case dealt with the issue of purposeful availment in the context 
of a contractual dispute. The defendant Rudzewicz was part-owner 
of a Burger King franchise in Michigan. The Florida-based Burger 
King Corporation sued Rudzewicz and his partner in Florida for 
breach of contract and trademark infringement. The defendants had 
allegedly fallen behind in their monthly contract payments and had 
continued to use Burger King trademarks and trade secrets after 
being forbidden to do so by the company. The franchise agreement 
had been negotiated in Michigan through Burger King's regional 
office, which in tum had cleared the terms of the ultimate agreement 
with the Florida headquarters. The contract obligated Rudzewicz to 
make payments to the company in Florida and provided that disputes 
would be governed by Florida law. Rudzewicz contended that Flor-
ida could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over him due to 
his lack of substantial purposeful contacts with the state. The 
Eleventh Circuit accepted this argument, but the Supreme Court 
reversed in a 6-2 decision. 53 
In Burger King, the Court again viewed purposeful availment as 
a means for distinguishing between fortuitous and anticipated rela-
tionships with a particular state. Although Rudzewicz had no physi-
cal contacts with Florida and had established his relationship with 
51. Brieffor Appellant at 18-20, Calder ". Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (No. 82-1401) (1984). 
52. 471 U.S. 462 (198S). 
53. Justice Powell did not participate in the case. Id. at 487. 
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Burger King only through his dealings with the Michigan office, 
"he most certainly knew that he was affiliating himself with an 
enterprise based primarily in Florida." 54 The Court stated that the 
obvious level of control that Burger King had exercised over the 
contract negotiations, the nature of Rudzewicz's contractual rela-
tionship with the company, and the choice of law provision con-
tained in the contract, all should have alerted him that he was 
entering into a relationship with a Florida resident, not a Michigan 
resident. Although his contacts with a Florida resident might 
arguably be viewed as indirect contacts with Florida, ss the Court 
said that these contacts plainly did not result from a mere accident 
of fate, as had the retailer defendant's contacts with Oklahoma in 
World-Wide Volkswagen. Rudzewicz had every reason to expect 
that his contractual dealings with Burger King, though they origi-
nated in Michigan, would have an impact in Florida and could give 
rise to litigation there. In the majority's view, this was adequate to 
satisfy the purposeful availment criterion, which in turn justified a 
Florida court's assertion of jurisdiction over him. 
The Shaffer to Burger King line of cases illustrates that, al-
though the Supreme Court has never expressly defined purposeful 
availment, in recent years it has typically used that term to describe 
a pattern of behavior by a defendant that can objectively be expected 
to result in contacts between the defendant and the state in question. 
The Court's decisions indicate that the defendant must undertake 
affirmative acts that ultirilately bring him in contact with the state, 
but they also make clear that "purpose" does not equal "subjective 
intent," that "purpose;' has very little to do with "control," and 
that ' 'purposeful" contacts need not be direct ones. Thus, the 
Court's inability to reach a consensus about whether Asahi's acts 
amounted to conduct "purposefully directed" toward California is 
difficult to comprehend. 
54. Id. at 480. 
55. On one hand. it seems somewhat disingenuous to characterize Rudzev.icz·s c0n-
tacts as . ·indirect." inasmuch liS be e\idently made payments directly to Burger King at its 
Miami beadquaners. But as both the Ele\'emh Circuit and Justice Ste'iens in his dissenting 
opinion observed. all negotiations leading to consummation of the contractual agreemem 
took place in !-fichigan between Rudzev.icz. his partner. and Burger King's Michigan 
office. The Michigan office furnished all services to which Rudzev.icz was entitled and 
supervision to which be had agreed under the contract. In this sense. Burger King had 
"insulated itself from direct dealings v.ith .. Rudzev.icz. id. at 489 (quoting Burger King \'. 
MacShara. 724 F.2d 1505. 1512 (lIth Cir. 1984}), and so the defendant's principal c0n-
tacts with Florida were only indirect. 
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C. The Role of Purposeful Avai1ment 
In the same cases in which it was fleshing out the meaning of 
Hanson's purposeful availment requirement, the Court was trying to 
explain why the concept was integral to jurisdictional due process. 
The Hanson Court's statement that a defendant's purposeful avail-
ment of the benefits of a particular forum's laws was relevant to 
personal jurisdiction, added an important gloss to the fairness-
oriented minimum contacts analysis. The Court justified this gloss 
by stating that personal jurisdiction doctrine purports to protect state 
sovereignty, and that requiring purposeful availment ensures that a 
state does not improperly transgress its territorial bounds in exercis-
ing its adjudicatory powers. 56 The subsequent purposeful availment 
decisions, however. reflect considerable discomfort with both of 
these assertions. Not surprisingly, the vacillations in these later 
decisions have coincided with the Court's everchanging views 
regarding the emphasis that personal jurisdiction doctrine should ac-
cord to state sovereignty considerations. 
In Shaffer, for example, the Court was anxious to repudiate the 
idea that territorial concerns oUght to playa significant role in deter-
mining the limits of state court jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants.57 Otherwise, it would be difficult to justify abolishing pure 
in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, which had been permissible 
bases for jurisdiction under the territorial model. 
Likewise, in Kulko, the Court's overarching concern was with 
fairness, not sovereignty. Significantly, the Court's conclusion that 
the father had not purposefully availed himself of the benefits of 
California law did not end the matter, though under the Hanson for-
mulation of the minimum contacts test it would have. Other factors, 
such as the potential adverse impact on California's exercise of 
jurisdiction on substantive social policies, were equally relevant and 
ultimately determinative. 58 
Three years later. however, World-Wide Volksv.:agen vivified 
both the underlying premise of Hanson-that personal jurisdiction 
doctrine protects state sovereignty-and the correlative notion that 
jurisdiction is improper in the absence of purposeful availment. The 
Court insisted that the minimum contacts test: 
56. Hanson. 357 t.:.S. at 251. 
5;. Shaffer. 433 C.S. at 213-14. 
58. KJdko, 436 {i.S. at 96-101. 
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perform[s] two related, but distinguishable functions. It protects 
the defendant against the burden of litigating in a distant or 
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, 
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed 
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal 
system.S9 
257 
The Court thus implied that the purposeful availment requirement 
fosters the federalism aspect of minimum contacts analysis. 60 
Unfortunately, the Court's reasoning on this subject is SOI1le-
what confusing. According to the majority, a defendant that has 
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of a particular state "has 
clear notice that it is subject to suit there. "61 Vlhat notice to the 
defendant has to do with protecting federalism, however, is not 
clearly explained. The Court's reminder that a defendant on notice 
that he may be sued in a particular state "can act to alleviate the risk 
of burdensome litigation by . . . severing its connection with the 
State"62 suggests that reciprocity of benefits and burdens is impor-
tant. Notwithstanding the confusion, World-Wide Volkswagen 
plainly stood for the proposition that in the absence of purposeful 
availment, there was no assurance that the exercise of jurisdiction 
did not encroach on another state's sovereignty. 
In Burger King, the Court again retreated63 from its assertions 
that due process limitations on jurisdiction exist to protect state 
sovereignty. ~ The case arguably represents a return to Interna-
tional Shoe's basic "minimum contacts" framework. The opinion 
does not expressly refer to any state sovereignty component of due 
process; as in Shaffer, the Court's primary concern in the case was 
with whether the assertion of jurisdiction was Hfair. ,-
59. World-Wuie Jolkswagen. ~ C.S. at 291-92. 
60. Id. at 294. 
61. [d. at 297. 
62. /d. 
63. The Coon began its retreat in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des 
Bauxites de Guinee. 456 l:.S. 694 (1982). While the Coon ackoou'ledged the sovereignty 
rationale for due process limitations on jurisdiction. it stated that "[t]he personal jurisdic-
tion req'Jirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a 
restriction on judicial po ..... er DOt as a matter of sovereignty. but as a matter of individual 
liberty:' [d. at 702 (f()(){I)()(e omitted). 
64. Of course. the very requirement that a defendant must ha\'e minimum contacts \\ith 
the forum state contains an element of federalism. Moreo\·er. the Court also noted the 
relevance of factors such as the forum state's interest in the litigation and the interests of 
the interstate judicial system. factors that implicitly take so\'ereignty concerns into 
account. Burger King. 105 S. Ct. at 2184. 
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Burger King seems to establish the proposition that if a defen-
dant's contacts with the forum state result from purposeful avail-
mem, jurisdiction is presumptively "fair." If they do not, the 
plaintiff appears to have the burden of showing that other factors 
weigh in favor of jurisdiction. 65 Burger King thus casts the pur-
poseful avaiIment requirement in a new role: a threshold indicator 
of fairness that can conveniently allocate the burden of persuasion 
on the question of the appropriateness of jurisdiction. The case alsO 
suggests, however, that in some circumstances a state court could 
fairly assert personal jurisdiction even if the defendant had no pur-
poseful contacts with the forum state. 
The Court's jurisdictional decisions antedating Asahi display 
erratic swings between a conviction that personal jurisdiction doc-
trine must protect federalism and the abandonment of that premise. 
With Burger ,King, purposeful availment inquiry apparently had 
evolved from a device to ensure that states did not overstep their ter-
ritorial bounds to one that allocated the burden of persuasion on the 
question of fairness. Thus, although the concept of "purposeful 
availment" retains a special significance, Burger King left open the 
possibility that a defendant's "nonpurposeful" contacts with a state 
will be constitutionally sufficient to support jurisdiction. 
IV. The Stream of Commerce Theory of Personal Jurisdiction 
The foregoing discussion has illustrated that the notion of pur-
poseful availment has played a central role in the Court's personal 
65. The critical language in Burger King is as follows: 
Once it has been decided that a defendant pmposefully established minimum 
cootacts within the forum &ate, these contacts may be considered in light of 
other factors to determine wbedler the assertion of personal jurisdiction would 
compon with ufuir play and substantial justice." Thus coons in "appropriate 
case[sr' may evaluate "the burden on the defendant," "the forum State's in-
terest in adjudicating the dispute," uthe plaintiff's interest in obtaining conve-
nient and effective relief," "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining 
the most efficiem resolution of controversies," and the ushared interest of the 
several States in fuItbering fundamental substantive social policies." These 
considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction 
upon a lesser ~ing of minimum contacts than would otberv.ise be required. 
On the other hand, where a defendant who bas purposefully directed his ac-
tivities toWard forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, be must present a 
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render 
jurisdiction unreasonable. 
&uger King. lOS S. Ct. at 2184-84 (citations omitted). This language seems to en\·ision 
ciJrnmsrances in which jurisdiction would be appropriate Voithout a showing of purposeful 
HeinOnline -- 7 Rev. Litig. 259 1987-1988
1988] PERSONAL JURISDICTION 259 
jurisdiction jurisprudence. Part IV will demonstrate that courts 
have facilitated the expansion and enforcement of state and federal 
substantive policies in a number of areas by interpreting the concept 
of purposeful availment to include a defendant's act of placing its 
products in the stream of commerce. These areas include products 
liability, intellectual property, environmental law, and tax. 
A. The Need for &1ended Jurisdiction 
The evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine coincided with 
an era of rapid changes in the substantive tort law governing prod-
ucts liability. Beginning in the early 1960s, the privity of contract 
requirement, which had circumscribed the utility of warranty 
theories of products liability, was eliminated by statute or judicial 
fiat in many jurisdictions. 66 States then began adopting section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which made manufac-
turers and distributors of defective products strictly liable for 
design, manufacturing, and marketing defects that caused injuries to 
persons or property. 67 To date, at least thirty-eight states have 
a\'ailment by the defendant. Compare Perschbacher, supra note 4, at 625-28 (/huger King 
"significantly dilutes" the purposeful avaiIment requirement). But see R. CASAD. supra 
note 3, at § 2.04[2][e][viii] ("The existence of ... purposeful action ... while rerewuy. 
is not sufficient. "). 
66. Early in this century. many state courts created a food pnxlucts exception to the 
privity of contract requirement 'for breach of warranty actions. In 1960. Kew Jersey 
abolished the privity requirement in pnxlucts liability actions in the leading case of Hen-
ningsen \'. Bloomfield Motors .. Inc .• 32 N.J. 358. 161 A.2d 69 (960). Within the next 
few years. most other state high courts followed suit. See generally 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. 
(CCH) § 1210 and cases cited therein. In addition, many state legislatures adopred U.C.c. 
§ 2-318 of the Uniform Commexcial Code, which expressly abolishes the requirement of 
horizontal privity in warranty actions and has been interpreted in many jurisdictions to 
abolish the vertical privity requirement as well. See generally J. WIDTE & R. St.'WMERS, 
U~1I'OR.\{ CoMMERCIAL CODE 401-10 (2d ed. 1980). Although strict products Iiability 
theories have supplanted the need to rely on warranty theories in personal injury and pr0p-
erty damage cases in most jurisdictions. the latter are still important in states that ha\'e 
refused to adopt strict liability. They may also be important where innocent bystanders, 
rather than direct consumers of products. are injured as a result of product defects. See 
King & ~e\'ille. The Bystander's Right Under Stria liability Does Erist: A Call for 
Reform of the Restatement. 25 ST. LollS l:.L.J. 543 (1981); Note. Strict Prrxbu:ts liabil-
ity to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism. 38 l:. Cm. L. REv. 625 
(1971). 
67. Section 402A pro\ides: 
(1) One v.ilo sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or conswner. or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product. and 
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embraced the basic theory of strict liability articulated in section 
402A; another eight have some variation of strict liability in defec-
tive products cases. 68 
These developments made it far more likely that plaintiffs alleg-
ing injuries caused by defective products would have the interest and 
incentive to sue defendants having few if any direct contacts with 
the state in which injury occurred. Not surprisingly, the stream of 
commerce theory originated and has been invoked most often iIi 
products liability cases. 69 In products liability cases, the theory 
enables courts to assert specific jurisdiction over all defendants who 
may be liable. In such actions, state tort law generally contemplates 
joint and several liability for defendants within the chain of distribu-
tion. The plaintiff usually has the option of suing the retailer, 
distributor, or manufacturer, or all of them, even though she likely 
had direct contact only with the retailer. 
In such cases, jurisdictional problems arise because those defen-
dants higher than the retailer in the chain of distribution often have 
no udirect" connections with the forum state. The defective prod-
uct manufactured or marketed by these remote defendants enters the 
stream of commerce outside the forum state. Perhaps it was pur-
chased there by a broker or other middleman and sold to entities 
operating within the forum state. 70 Alternatively, as was the case in 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product. and 
(b) the user or consumer has DOt bought the product from or entered into any 
comracrual relation with the seller. 
REsr."lEME.'-' (Sro:>~L» OF TORTS § 402A (1963). The seller of a product includes the 
manufacturer, distributor. and retailer. [d.. comment f. Most jurisdictions that have 
adopted section 402A have extended its protection to bystanders as well as direct pur-
chasers of products. thus significantly broadening the class of persons entitled to sue for 
personal injuries or property damage resulting from product defects. See King & !'eville. 
supra DOte 66. at 569-73; W. KEEros. D. DoBBS. R. KEEros & D. OWES. PROSSER "-'1) 
~os1HELAwOFTORTS § 100 CW. Keeton 5th ed. 1984}. 
68. For a listing of jurisdictions that have adopted section 402A of the Restatement or 
some variation of strict liability theory. see 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) § 4016. 
69. See Gray v. American Radiator & StandaId Sanitary COIJl., 22 m. 2d 432. 176 
N.E.2d 761 (1961): see also, e.g .• Walsh v. Sational Seating Co .. 411 F. Supp. 564 tn. 
Mass. 1976): Bush v. BASF Wyandotte CoIJl., 64 ~.C. App. 41, 306 S.E.2d 562 (1983): 
Ross v. Spiegel, Inc .• 53 Ohio App. 2d 297.373 N.E.2d 1288 (977): Phillips v. Anchor 
Hocking Glass CoIJl .• 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (966). 
70. E.g .• Oswalt v. Scriplo. Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1981); Pennington Grain & 
Seed, Inc. v. Murrow Bros. Seed Co .. Inc .. 400 So. 2d 157 (Fla. DiSl. Ct. App. 1981): 
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Asahi, the defective product may have been incorporated as a com-
ponent part of a finIshed product that was distributed in the forum 
state or even nationwide.71 Typically, the remote defendant claims 
that the relevant long arm statute does not authorize jurisdiction 
over him and that he lacks sufficient minimum contacts with the 
forum state to support an assertion of jurisdiction over him. 72 
The stream. of commerce theory has also been invoked in cases 
alleging patent, copyright, and trademark infringement and viola-
tions of federal antitrust, tax, and environmental laws.73 It is par-
Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 1985); Hewitt v. Eichelman's Subaru. 
Inc., 492 A.2d 23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (distribution through "independent" (49% 
o\lmed) subsidiary; sales made F.O.B. Japan); Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 
S.W.2d 199 (rex. 1985) (sales through foreign broker). 
71. E.g., Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 7(1) (8th Cir. 1984) (Japanese 
manufacturer of component automobile part; jurisdiction denied); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Atwood Vacuum Mach. Co .• 392 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1981) (domestic manufacturer of 
automobile part: jurisdiction upheld), cerro denied, 452 U.S. 901 (1981). 
72. See, e.g., Thornton V. Toyota Motor Sales, 397 F. Supp. 476. 479 (N.D. Ga. 
1975) (defendant denied sufficient contacts under Georgia long arm statute and federal con-
stitutional law); Simeone v. Federal Press Co., 40 Conn. 173. 485 A.2d 587 (1984) 
(defendant subject to jurisdiction under Connecticut·s long arm statute and under minimum 
contacts test of due process); Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273 (Del. 1984) (defendant 
challenged assertion of jurisdiction under Delaware long arm statute and due process). 
73. See, e.g., Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1985) (asser-
ting jurisdiction over German manufacturer in patent infringement claim based on manu-
facturer's aggregate national contacts); Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 708 
F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1983) (invoking forum jurisdiction over patent infringement claim 
based on defendant's sale of other products in forum and advertisement of infringing prod-
ucts in national trade magazine); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein \'. Kaiser Stuhl Wine 
Distrib. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Stobilisierungsfonds] 
(jurisdiction over Australian defendants proper where defendants had arranged for intro-
duction of patent infringing product in L' .S. stream of commerce \\ith expectation that 
product would be sold nationally); Amba Mktg. Sys. \'. Jobar Infl. Inc .• 551 F.2d 784 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction over patent and trademark infringement sought by virtue of defen-
dant's distribution of competing merchandise in interstate commerce): Triple A Partnership 
v. MPL Communications, Inc .• 629 F. Supp. 1520 (D. Kan. 1986) (revenue received from 
nation\\oide sale and promotion of defendant's composition sufficient to confer jurisdiction 
in copyright infringement): Tonka Corp. v. ThiS Entertainment, Inc .• 638 F. Supp. 386 
(D. Minn. 1985) (jurisdiction in trademark infringement claim based on defendant's place-
ment of its television program into stream of commerce with expectation that viewers in all 
states would watch): Payne v. Kristofferson, 631 F. Supp. 39. 43 <N.D. Ga. 1985) (defen-
dant's nation\\ide recording. performance. promotion, and sale of copyrighted material 
introduced infringing song into stream of commerce): Violet v. Picillo. 613 F. Supp. 1563 
(D.R.I. 1985) (defendant producers of hazardous wastes, having introduced products into 
stream of commerce. subject to jurisdiction of state where products were illegally 
dumped): Cluysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp .• 589 F. Supp. 1182 m.D.c. 1984) 
(jurisdiction theory in antitrust suit against joint venture based on future introduction of 
proposed product into stream of commerce); United States Y. Toyota Motor Corp .• 561 F. 
Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (sale of foreign defendant's products on nation\\ide basis 
through wholly-owned domestic subsidiary gave rise to jurisdiction for IRS tax audit): Hin 
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ticularly imponant in cases where an alien defendant has committed 
the alleged violation of federal law abroad. Such defendants often 
have no direct contacts with the United States, much less with any 
particular state, because they insulate themselves from direct deal-
ings in this country through various intermediaries.74 Accordingly, 
they can be sued in this country only to the extent that their indirect 
marketing contacts are deemed constitutionally sufficient under 
International Shoe and its progeny. 75 
B. Origins and Evolution of the Stream of Commerce Theory 
After International Shoe, state legislatures began to devise long 
arm statutes with expansively worded provisions designed to take 
advantage of the broad implications of minimum contacts analysis. 
Most statutes specified the contacts and nature of conduct that would 
subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the state's courts, and they 
generally provided for specific jurisdiction only. 76 A few states 
v. Nissan Motor Co:, 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (jurisdiction over antitrust claim 
against price-fixing consPiracy upheld where foreign defendant caused its products to be 
shipped and sold in U.S.): 
74. See supra I10le 73. Slobilisierungsfonds involved a West German defendant with a 
domestic importer. Uni1ed States v Toyota, similarly, involved a Japanese defendant v.ith 
a wbolly-ov .. ned subsidiary. 
75. The federal COW1S have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright infringe-
ment cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1986), and concurrent jurisdiction over trademark 
infringement cases. id. There is no federal statute authorizing nationwide service of pro-
cess against defendants in such cases, and so under FED. R. Cr .... P. 4fe), the federal coon 
must use state law standards to assess the validity of its assertion of personal jurisdiction. 
Rule 4(e) thus requires the federal coon to consider the constitutional sufficiency of a 
defendant's contacts v.ith the state in which the federal coon is sitting rather than its aggre-
gate COntactS v.itb the United States. 
In federal tax and antitrust cases. federal <;taMes permit nationwide service of process. 
See 26 t:.S.c. § 7402(b) (1982) (tax suits by U.S.); 15 C.S.C. § 22 (1982) (antitruSt). In 
these cases. the propriety of personal jurisdiction turns on whether the defendant's contacts 
v.ith the l"nited States as a whole are constitutionally sufficient to support jurisdiction. 
Some commentatOrS have urged that. in cases of alien defendants involving a federal 
question. an aggregate contacts theory should be used irrespective of whether a state or 
federal long arm statute is being used as a basis to acquire juriscliction. See. e.g .• Lilly. 
Jurisdiction (A·er Domestic and Alien Defendanls, 69 VA. L. 1m .. 85. In Asahi. the 
Supreme Coon expressly declined to address the aggregate contacts theory. Asahi. 107 S. 
Ct. at 1033. 
76. See. e.g., FL ... STAT. § 48.193 (987); ME. REv. STAT. A,"!,. tit. 14. § 704-A 
n980,: KA.'i". STAT. A'"!'. § 60-308 (1983): N.C. GEs. ST.>.T. § 1-7504 (1983): OHIo 1m". 
Coo£ A,"!,. § 2307.382 (Anderson 1981); S.D. CooIFlED LAws A,"!,. § 15-7-2 (984). 
Many specific jurisdiction statutes tracked to a large extent the language of the Illinois long 
arm statute, 1955 lli. Laws p. 2238. 2245-46 (current version at ILL. 1m'. STAT. ch. 110. 
§ 2-209 (1983». or of U~lF{)R)f hlER.S7 ... n: A."1> hTER..'i"AllOS.>J. PRocEDL"RES Acr § 1.03 
(1986). 
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opted for extremely broad statutes permitting their courts to exercise 
jurisdiction whenever doing so was consistent with due process.7'1 
Beginning in the early 1960s, the enumerated jurisdiction 
statutes were interpreted nearly uniformly as conferring jurisdiction 
in "single tort" cases where an isolated contact with the forum state 
resulted in injury to the plaintiff. 78 Statutory language was seldom 
viewed as an obstacle to such an assertion of jurisdiction, and the 
constitutionality of such assertions seemed settled by McGee. 79 
Accordingly, most state and federal courts upheld the constitu-
tionality of single tort jurisdictional provisions based on McGee's 
reasoning. 80 The broad general jurisdiction statutes were also inter-
preted to confer jurisdiction in single tort cases. 
The stream of commerce theory evolved quite naturally from 
these single tort cases. One of the earliest decisions endorsing 
the theory was Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp. ,81 an influential and widely cited case interpreting illinois' 
long arm statute. Gray was a stream of commerce case in the purest 
sense: an lllinois plaintiff injured in an explosion caused by an alleg-
edly defective water heater sued both the Pennsylvania manufacturer 
of the water heater and Titan, the Ohio manufacturer of a valve 
77. E.g .. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CoDE § 410.10 (West 1973); R.I. GEs. u.v.-s § 9-5-33 
(1985). Some state supreme courts have interpreted their enumerated jurisdiction Stannes 
to contemplate the assertion of personal jurisdiction whenever constitutionally permissible. 
thus eliminating the need for separate statutory and constitutional inquiries into the propri-
ety of a particular assertion of juiisdiction. E.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp .. 
100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966) (construing AML. R. CI\·. P. 4(e)(2»); State ex reI. 
Deere and Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1979) (construing Mo. A'~. ST."", § 
506.500 (l987}): U-Anchor Advenising, Inc. v. Bun, 553 S.W.2d 7(JJ (Tex. 19F) (con-
struing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. A'~. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964». 
78. For examples of cases interpreting specific jurisdiction stanttes to confer jurisdic-
tion based on a single act, see Currie. The Growth of the Long Ann: Eight Years of 
Exrended Jurisdiaion in l/lin.ois, 1963 U. Iu.. L.F. 533, passim; Nore, &rroactive 
Erpansion of State Court Jurisdiction Over Persons, 63 Cou."M. L. REv. 1105. 1105 
nn.6-9 (1963). 
79. See supra notes 33-35 and accompaDjing text. 
SO. Rebozo 'i. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208. 1214 n.17 15th Cir. 1975): 
Sewman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. (S.D. Ga. 1971): Beck v. Spindler. 256 Minn. 543. 99 
N.W.2d 670 (959); Le\1.in v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599. 249 ~.Y.S.2d 
49 (1964). 
81. 22 lli. 2d 432. 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Although Gray is widely perceived as the 
first case to invoke the stream of commerce theory, the opinion did not acrually use the 
phrase "stream of commerce." The first decision explicitly to link the phrase .. ith per-
sonal jurisdiction doctrine appears to have been Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539. 
546 (D. Minn. 1964). An early Oklahoma case bad upheld jurisdiction in what was essen-
tially a stream of commerce case under an ancient "doing business" statute. S. Howes 
Co. Y. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954). 
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incorporated into the heater. Titan's sole apparent contact with illi-
nois was that its product had caused injury there. 82 The cause of 
action unquestionably was related to this contact. 
Gray addressed both the statutory and the constitutional ques-
tions implicit in asserting jurisdiction based on the stream of com-
merce theory. The llIinois long ann statute authorized jurisdiction 
over any defendant that "commi[ts] a tortious act within the 
state. "83 Although Titan had never been in llIinois and had never 
committed any physical act there, the court held that it fell within 
the statutory language. Analogizing to rules governing choice of 
law and commencement of the mnning of the statute of limitations, 
the court reasoned that because the "last act" giving rise to the 
lawsuit-the explosion-had occurred in Illinois, and because that 
injury could be attributed to Titan's tortious behavior, Tjtan had 
committed a tortious act within the state as the statute required. 84 
The court explained its conception of the constitutional issue in 
the following terms: 
The relevant decisions since Pennoyer v. Neff show a develop-
ment of the concept of personal jurisdiction from one which 
requires service of process within the State to one which is 
satisfied either if the act or transaction occurs there or if a defen-
dant has engaged in a sufficiently substantial course of activity in 
the state, provided always that reasonable notice and opportunity 
to be heard are afforded . . . the trend in defining due process of 
law is away from the emphasis on territorial limitations and 
toward emphasis on providing adequate notice and opportunity to 
be heard: from the court with immediate power over the defen-
dant, toward the court in which both parties can most conven-
iently settle their dispute. 85 
Given this understanding of the constitutional test for personal juris-
diction, the court reasoned, assertion of jurisdiction over the Ohio 
defendant was undoubtedly permissible: 
[I]f a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in 
another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any 
damages caused by defects in those products . . . . Where the 
alleged liability arises ... from the manufacture of products 
82. The roUIt assumed that, apart from the heater that injured the plaintiff, a substan-
tial number of wetter heaters containing Titan's \"a1ves were sold in lllinois. But it is 
unclear from the opinion whether the record supports this assnmption and whether this fact 
was essential to the outcome of the case. 
83. Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209(2) (1983). 
84. Gray. 22 TIL 2d at 435~36. 176 N.E.2d at 763. 
85. Id. at 440-41, 176 N.E.2d at 765. 
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presumably sold in contemplation of use here, it should not mat-
ter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman 
or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into 
[the state]. "86 
In Gray, the court was plainly mistaken in suggesting that ter-
ritorial concerns were no longer a significant aspect of the constitu-
tional test for personal jurisdiction. Hanson had made that clear 
three years earlier. Moreover, the Supreme Court had never inti-
mated that the litmus test of due process was whether the forum 
selected was "the court in which both parties can most conveniently 
settle their dispute."81 Nevertheless, the court did address the 
critical question of whether the defendant had purposefully availed 
itself of the benefits of lllinois law. The court observed that the 
defendant had engaged in a course of conduct that predictably had 
resulted in the use of its products in Dlinois, a use from which it 
received economic benefits. 88 
Most courts and commentators have perceived Gray as consis-
tent with the constitutional framework established in International 
Shoe, McGee, and Hanson. 89 After all, cases upholding jurisdiction 
on a stream of commerce theory are but one step removed from 
cases in which an out-of-state manufacturer ships its product directly 
to an in-state distributor or retailer.90 In the latter type of case, the 
86. [d. at 442. 176 S.E.2d at 766. 
87. Id. at 443. 176 S.E.2d at 766. 
88. [d. For an important contemporaneous discussion of the Gray decision, see Cur-
rie, supra note 78. at 545-60. See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 
1151-52. . 
89. E.g .• Baker \". Associated Banking Corp .. 592 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1979): ~icBreen 
v. Beech .-\ircraft Corp .. 543 F.2d 26,30 17th Cir. 1976) (dictum): Jones Enter. , .. Atlas 
Ser\". Corp .. 442 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1971); Blum v. Kawaguchi. 331 F. Supp. 216 
(D. Seb. 1971): Phillips .... Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 
(966); Currie. supra DOte 78, at 560 ('·the upholding of jurisdiction in Gray • .• was a 
commendable decision . . . fully consistent v.ith the due-process requiremem of fimdamen-
tal fairness'"). 
90. E.g .• Chovan .... E. I. DuPont de Semours & Co .. 217 F. Supp. 808 fE.D. Mich. 
1963,: Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960). As 
one court observed: 
[\\lhere a corporation v.ith substantial contacts within state X ships into that state 
a product which it has manufactured in State Y and an injury occurs in state X 
because of an alleged defect in the product. the corporation may cOnstitutionally 
be called upon to defend a products liability suit brought in state X where the 
injury occurred. This result also oOOrins v.-here the manufacturer has elected to 
distribute his wares through independem wholesaler!; instead of through its OV.ll 
corporate appararus so that it is only very indirectly responsible for the product 
reaching the injured consumer. The present trend is to take the next logical step 
and hold that corporation ansv.-erable where it introduces its product into the 
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manufacturer has purposefully established a contact with the state in 
question. It has derived economic benefits from the contact. Han-
son's purposeful availment requirement is clearly met. 
When a product comes into a state via the efforts of an out-of-
state distributor, a broker, or the manufacn.rrer of a finished product 
into which the product has been incorporated, the manufacturer's 
contacts may not be as direct, but they are nevertheless the result of 
its purposeful activity. If it wishes to avoid accountability for itS 
product's defects in a particular state, a manufacturer has the option 
of distributing its product through intermediaries who will not sell it 
there. It seems questionable to suggest that a state cannot assert 
specific jurisdiction when the manufacn.rrer fully expects its goods to 
be sold within the state, and the goods subsequently cause injury 
there. 
Initially, many courts embracing the stream of commerce the-
ory after Gray reasoned that whenever it was "foreseeable" to the 
defendant that its product would find its way into the state, the 
notice function of the due process requirement was satisfied. 91 This 
""foreseeability" test permitted state courts to entertain suits not just 
against defendants who place goods in the stream of commerce with 
the expectation that they would be marketed in a particular state, but 
also against defendants who market consumer goods anywhere, 
because manufacturers can always foresee that such goods may be 
taken by their purchasers to remote jurisdictions. 
Of course, this broad foreseeability conception of the theory is 
inconsistent with World-Wide Volkswagen, in which the Court stated 
that the portability or mobility of a consumer good does not, by 
itself, furnish adequate notice of the possibility of being sued in a 
stream of iDletstate COIDJIlelCe if it had reason to know or expect that its product 
would be broaght into the stale where the injury occurred [ .] 
Coolter v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 426 F.2d 1315. 1318 (5th Cir. 1970) (citations 
omitted). 
91. Su. e.g., Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(jurisdiction proper where defendant .. introduced [carnival ride] into interstate commerce 
with reason to know that the ride would probably eventually oomadize through the state"); 
Adanbc Tubing & Rubber Co. v. Imematiooal Engraving Co., 364 F. Supp. 787. 791-92 
(D.R.L 1973) (coosuuing Gray to pemrlt assenion of jurisdiction whenever it is 
foresceabloe that defendant's product may cause injury in the stale) (dictum); Anderson v. 
Nabooal Presto Indus .• 257 Iowa 911. 135 NoW. 639. 643 (1965) (jurisdiction proper over 
U0l • .r:g1Dret' whose products are "ordinarily designed for commercial sale in whatever 
maIhIs may be fowJd for them"); Blamey ,'. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978) 
(jnrisdidion proper where defendant could foresee that sale of liquor at Wisconsin border 
bar coo1d have consequences in Minnesota). 
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remote jurisdiction.92 But World-Wule Volkswagen cannot be 
perceived as a repudiation of a stream of commerce theory based on 
the notion of expectation rather than foreseeability. Indeed, the 
majority distinguished cases such as Gray, in which a corporation 
has "deIiver[ed] its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum 
State, "93 and stated explicitly in dicta that the assertion of jurisdic-
tion in such a case would not violate due process. 94 
The Supreme Court's express sanction of the stream of com-
merce theory in World-Wide Volkswagen, which was reiterated in 
Burger King, 9S appeared to resolve any lingering doubts about its 
validity. Most courts subsequently accepted the theory, many bas-
ing their decisions on the Court's earlier dicta.96 Indeed, after 
World-Wide Volkswagen, a number of states amended their long arm 
statutes to provide explicitly for personal jurisdiction over defen-
dants whose products enter the state through the regular course of 
commerce. 97 By the time the Court rendered its Asahi decision 
early in 1987, courts in at least sixteen states,98 and most federal 
92. World-Wule Volkswagen, 444 u.s at 295-96. 
93. Id. at 298. 
94. Id. at 297-98. 
95. 471 u.S. at 474 n.l7. 
96. Indeed, the California Supreme Court expressly relied on World-Yule 
Yolhwagm's dicta cooceming the stream of connnerce theory in upboIding the Asahi trial 
court's assertion of jurisdiction. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 45, 7(12 P.2d at 548,216 Cal. Rptr. 
at 389. See also, e.g., Noel v. S: S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150, 1153-55 (6th Cir. 1982); 
Oswalt v. Scripta, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980); Tonka Corp. v. TMS Entertain-
ment, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 386,389 (D. Minn. 1985); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. 
v. Toshiba Corp .• 576 F. Supp. 312, 317 (D. Md. 1983); McBead Drilling Co. v. 
Kremco, Ltd., 509 So. 2d 429,432 (La. 1987); Hewitt v. Eicbelman's Subaru, Inc., 492 
A.2d 23, 25-26 (Pa. Super. 1985) (all upbolding stream of connnerce theoty based on 
World-Wule Yolhwagm). 
97. Al.As1tA STAT. § 09.05.015(4)(B) (1983) (instate injury from products processed or 
manufactured by defendant if used or coosumed in ontinaIy course of trade); FlA. STAT. 
A-.s. § 48.193(1)(f)(2) (Supp. 1987) (causing injury within Florida if products mamlfac-
tmed by defendant were used in ordinaIy course of COIDJIJClCC, trade, or use); LA. REv. 
STAT. A,,"S. § 13:3201(8) (West Supp. 1987) (mamfidwing of product inboduced inIo 
stream of commerce if foreseeable that product's nature and manufacturer's marketing 
practices woold bring product inro Louisiana); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.080 (1985) (service 
proper over any manufacturer who directly or indirectly mannfactures, markets or soppIics 
any product for instate distribution); N.C. GEs. STAT. § 1-75.4(4){b) (1983) (mstate injury 
from products processed, serviced, or manufactured by defendant if used in ordinary 
course of trade); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. A,"S. § 5322(a)(l)(iii) (Purdon 1981) ("doing 
business" in Pennsylvania includes shipping of merchandise directly or indiIectly inIo 
state). 
98. AJJjance Clodling, Ltd. v. District Court, 187 Colo. 400, 532 P.2d 351 (1975); 
Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273 (Del. 1984); N"KXlId, Inc. v. Beutoo, 467 So. 2d 
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appellate courts99 had mled that the stream of commerce theory 
comported with the principles articulated in International Shoe and 
its progeny. 100 
V. Justifying and Defending the Stream of Commerce Theory: 
The Asahi Opinions 
As Part m above demonstrated, the Court's decisions have been 
somewhat inconsistent in their pronouncements of the meaning and 
role of purposeful availment inquiry, with Shaffer, Kulko, and 
Burger King emphasizing fairness and Hanson and World-WuIe 
Volkswagen fOcusing on sovereignty concerns. But Asahi raised the 
question in the context of the stream of commerce theory, a context 
that had never been considered directly by the Court. The three 
Asahi opinions are suggestive of a fundamental disagreement among 
the justices concerning the meaning of purposeful availment and its 
relevance to jurisdictional analysis. More troublesome is that the 
dissension on the Court may undermine the Validity of the stream of 
commerce theory as it bas been understood and utiHzed by the lower 
courts. 
This part of the article considers the rationale given by the 
O'Connor plurality and some lower courts for rejecting the stream 
of commerce theory in specific jurisdiction cases. It contends that 
this reasoning cannot be reconciled with the Court' s prior jurisdic-
tional decisions. It further contends that the approach taken by a 
few lower courts, and perhaps by Justice Stevens-under which the 
1046 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1985); Doolin v. K·5 Telegage Co .• 75 TIL App. 3d 25, 393 
N.E.2d 556 (1979); Svendson v. Qaestor Corp .• 304 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1981); Volvo 
Corp. v. Wells. 551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. App. 1977): Boykin ". Lindenkranar, 252 So, 2d 
467 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. App. 1984); 
Metal-Malic. Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Coon,. 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966); 
Darien v. Wise Shoe Stores. 74 A.D.2d 342,427 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1980); Bush , .. BASF 
Wyandroe Corp •• 64 N.C. App. 41. 306 S.E.2d 562 (1983); Ross v. Spiegel. Inc., 53 
Ohio App. 2d 297, 373 N.E.2d 1288 (1977); Russell v. Bakom Chems., Inc., 328 
N.W.2d 476 (S.D. 1983); McCombs v. Cen:o Rentals. 622 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. App. 
1981); Demscb v. West Coast Mach. Co., 80 Wash. 2d 701,497 P.2d 1311. cert. denied. 
409 U.S. 1009 (1972); Olmstead v. American Granby Co., S65 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1977). 
99. E.g .• Manralbano v. Basco Hand Tools, 766 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1985); Fidelity and 
Casnalty Co. ,'. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
106 S. Ct. 853 (1986); Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 E2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. 
dm:ied 104 S. Ct. 1278 (1984); Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 
1983); Stabilisioungsfonds, 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981): Poyner ". Erma Werke 
GmbH. 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 449 u.s. 841 (1980) 
100. Sa also R. CAS..u>, supra note 3, at § 7.02[d]. 
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appropriateness of jurisdiction turns primarily on quantitative fac-
tors-is also flawed. This part concludes by suggesting that regard-
less of how one conceives the purposes of the due process limitation 
on state court personal jurisdiction, those purposes are not impaired 
when a court relies on the stream of commerce theory to support its 
assertion of specific jurisdiction. 
A. The O'Connor Plurality: Fault)' Premises and Troubling 
Implications 
Courts that have rejected the stream of commerce theory 
usually base their decisions on two premises. The first is that 
placing an article in the stream of commerce, with knowledge that 
it will be marketed and used in a remote jurisdiction, does not 
amount to purposeful availment as that term was used in Hanson 
and World-Wuie Volkswagen. The second is that a state court may 
never assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless that defen-
dant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum 
state's laws. To the extent that these premises purport to be derived 
from the Supreme Court's most recent jurisdictional decisions, both 
are faulty. 
The O'Connor plurality opinion illustrates the faultiness of 
these premises. It insists that Asahi had not engaged in acts con-
stituting "purposeful availment," a position with which the Brennan 
plurality expressly disagreed. 101 Justice O'Connor accepted, for the 
purposes of decision, that Asahi knew that a significant number of 
its valves were incorporated into tires marketed in California. She 
reasoned, however, that because Asahi did not ""create, control, or 
employ"I02 Cheng Shin's distribution network, did not specifically 
design its valves for use in California, and therefore did not have the 
kind and quantum of contacts that enable courts to conclude that a 
corporation is ""doing business" within a state, it had never pur-
posefully availed itself of the California market. In essence, the 
O'Connor plurality treated the facts underlying the cause of action 
in Asahi as conceptually indistinguishable from the facts underlying 
Hanson and World-Wuie Volkswagen. 
Yet surely there is a critical difference between the retailer 
defendant in World-Wide Volkswagen, whose contacts with 
101. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035. 
102. Id. at 1033. 
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Oklahoma resulted exclusively from the plaintiff's activities (Le. 
travelling through Oklahoma and having an accident there) and a 
defendant such as Asahi, whose contacts were the result of its own 
decision to sell its component parts to a manufacturer engaged in a 
worldwide marketing scheme. Courts, including the Supreme Court 
in WorId-W"ule Volkswagen,l03 and commentators have consistently 
recognized a distinction between ""portable tort" cases, in which a 
plaintiff-consumer or other third party is exclusively responsible for 
taking the injury-causing agent into the forum state, and true stream 
of commerce cases, in which a product causes injury in a jurisdic-
tion where it was original1y sold. 1M In the former category of 
cases, a defendant derives no measurable economic benefit from the 
plaintiff's ability to carry the product across state lines, and thus 
cannot be said to have availed itself of that particular mark~. In the 
latter category, the defendant who adopts a marketing scheme that 
expressly contemplates sales in a remote jurisdiction certainly prof-
its as a result of its intermediary's sales within that jurisdiction. 
Thus, even if purposeful availment is an essential aspect of fairness, 
one who deliberately places his product into the stream of commerce 
under circumstances clearly indicating that the product will be sold 
in state X has met this threshold requirement as to state X. 
Presumptively, he oUght to be subject to a lawsuit related to the 
product there unless other fairness considerations dictate otherwise. 
Why, then, have four justices in Asahi and several lower courts 
insisted that the stream of commerce theory does not adequately 
encompass purposeful availment? One explanation may be that they 
failed to perceive a difference between ""foreseeability" and ""ex-
pectation." The O'Connor plurality thought that it was merely 
foreseeable to Asabi that its valves would make their way to Califor-
nia, and foreseeability alone, according to World-W"ule Volks-
wagen, lOS does not furnish constitutionally sufficient notice of a 
court's potential claim to jurisdiction. This is absurd. Because 
Cheng Shin had sold tires containing Asahi's valves to a California 
motorcycle mamlfacturer for a number of years, the possibility that 
one of those valves, if defective, might cause injury in California 
103. World-Yule Volkswagen, 444 u.s. at 295-97. 
104. E.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(stream of commerce theory inapplicable where Japanese company performed conversion 
work in Japan on COOWJelciaI vessel, and vessel subsequently docked in New Jersey): see 
also Corrie, supm DOte 78, at 551; Jay, supm note 3, at 442-43, 448-50. 
lOS. World-Yule Volkslrogen, 444 U.S. at 295. 
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was not merely foreseeable. It was virtually cenain. Wherever one 
draws the line between foreseeability and expectation, the facts of 
almost any pure stream of commerce case, including those of Asahi, 
seem to fall on the side of expectation. 
Another explanation may be that the O'Connor plurality equates 
"unilateral" acts by third parties with "indirect" acts requiring the 
assistance of third parties. Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen 
said that the conduct of third parties alone cannot create contacts 
sufficient to support jurisdiction. 106 But these cases did not say that 
contacts created with the help of third parties are irrelevant to the 
jurisdictional question. In both cases, the defendant's contacts with 
the forum state materialized after the relationship giving rise to the 
lawsuit was formed and resulted from a third party's decision to 
cross state lines. In Asahi, however, the defendant's contacts with 
the forum state were created when its products made their way into 
the forum state, which was before its relationship began with the 
original plaintiff-when the plaintiff purchased the motorcycle with 
a defective tire valve. 107 The plaintiff's purchase was the expected 
result of Asahi's marketing strategy of selling to a Taiwanese tire 
manufacturer that did business within California. Although Cheng 
Shin had assisted Asahi in establishing its pre-accident relationship 
with the state, Asahi's contacts with California were not exclusively 
the result of "unilateral" activity by a third party. Indeed, a varia-
tion of this argument had been rejected in Calder, in which the 
Court had held that the defendants' nonparticipation in the distribu-
tion of offending magazines did not warrant characterizing their 
activities as nonpurposeful. 108 
The notion that indirect contacts with a state are not purposeful 
has serious implications. For example, it suggests that a remote 
manufacturer can always insulate itself from lawsuits in any state (or 
country) other than its own by selling its products F.O.B. at a single 
location, by using a single "independent" distributor to distribute 
its product nationwide, or by using brokers who theoretically are 
"responsible" for any direct contacts with a particular forum. Such 
a scenario could have a serious adverse impact on the development 
of state products liability law, impair enforcement of many federal 
106. [d. at 298: Hanson, 357 C.S. at 253. 
107. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1030. 
108. Calder, 465 C.S. at 789-90. 
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laws, and result in heavy litigation burdens on all parties involved in 
these lawsuits. 
One could argue that the O'Connor plurality's view that Asahi 
had not purposefully directed its activities toward California was 
influenced by the fact that only an indemnity action was at stake. 109 
Cheng Shin, after all, was the entity that was directly responsible 
for distributing Asahi's product in California. In this sense, Cheng 
Shin is arguably much like the plaintiff in World-Wide Volkn4,'agen: 
and the case is similar to the portable tort cases that are not gener-
ally perceived as falling within the stream of commerce theory. 
Yet the O'Connor plurality did not limit its rejection of the 
stream of commerce theory to indemnity cases not involving a plain-
tiff actually injured by a defective product. What the opinion said 
about the purposeful availment requirement would have prevented 
the original plaintiff from suing Asahi in California as well. More-
over, there is little support in the Court's past decisions for drawing 
this kind of distinction.110 If the O'Connor plurality had confined 
its reasoning to indemnity cases, it would have been suggesting that 
whether or not a defendant's connections with a state are the result 
of purposeful availment depends on who the plaintiff is. This mis-
directs the inquiry from the nature of the defendant's activities to the 
nature of the cause of action and confuses the narrow question of 
what constitutes purposeful availment with the broader one of 
whether the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable. 
A less obvious, but in some respects more troubling, conse-
quence of viewing the stream of commerce theory as constitutionally 
inadequate is that this would conform to the narrow and now ques-
tionable Hanson view that the virtually dispositive test for jurisdic-
tional propriety is whether there has been purposeful availment. As 
noted earlier, the Court's most recent pre-Asahi decisions shifted the 
theoretical focus away from sovereignty concerns toward a pure 
assessment of whether the exercise of jurisdiction is "fair." 111 One 
consequence of this, which Burger King tends to support, is that the 
concept of purposeful availment assumes its original role as a fair-
ness factor. Other factors include whether: (1) the court is asserting 
109. At least one coon has limited Asah!'s prounouncemell1S on the stream of commerce 
theoty to indemnity cases. See McBead Drilling Co. \'. Kremco, Ltd., 509 So. 2d 429, 
433 n.7 (La. 1987). 
110. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
Ill. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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specific or general jurisdiction, (2) the chosen forum is a convenient 
one, and (3) the state has an interest in regulating the matter at 
issue. 
That the O'Connor plurality placed so much emphasis on pur-
posefill availment may suggest a division on the Court about the role 
of federalism in personal jurisdiction doctrine. The only recent 
cases that treated the question of purposeful availment as dispositive 
were those in which territorial concerns were deemed predominant: 
Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen. The disagreement among the 
justices about whether the stream of commerce theory is constitu-
tionally adequate may mask a more basic split about the conceptual 
underpinnings of personal jurisdiction doctrine. If some members 
of the Coun disagree with the current trend toward repudiating the 
idea that personal jurisdiction doctrine protects state sovereignty, 
they should express their disagreement explicitly. 
Moreover, even if one does believe that the due process limita-
tions on personal jurisdiction should protect state sovereignty, the 
stream of commerce theory is consistent with such an approach. In 
international law, one well-recognized aspect of territorial jurisdic-
tion is "effects" jurisdiction: a state has jurisdiction over acts hav-
ing tangible consequen~es or effects within the state. 112 Effects 
jurisdiction justifies, for example, a state's criminalizing conduct 
that actually takes place outside the state but that causes injury 
within the state. 113 In most circumstances, the exercise of effects 
112. Effects jurisdiction is based on the objective territorial principle of international 
law. See generally !\ore. Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Acr of 
1979 (;nder ImemaJional and American Law, 81 MIcH. L. R:;\'. 1308, 1327-1329 (1983). 
Although the scope of effects jurisdiction is unclear and the "C.S. couns' extension of the 
principle to cover intangible economic effects criticized, it appears that most authorities 
and states would recognize effects jurisdiction where effects are direct, immediate, and 
form a pan of the actus reus that is sought to be regulated. h[MJany countries ... inter-
pret crimina1law in the sense that offenses. the authors of which at the momem of commis-
sion of [the crime] are in the territory of another state. are nevertheless to be regarded as 
having been committed in the national territory. if one of the constituent elements of the 
offense, and more especially its effects, have taken place there .... " Case of the 5.5. 
Lotus (France and Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.1., Ser. A., No. 10, 19-23 (Judgment of Sept. 7). 
2 World Ct. Rep. (1930). See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.ld 
597, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1976); Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiaion and the C:niud Slates 
Antitrust J.m.,·s, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. hTL L. 146, 160; Rosenthal, Jllrisdictiona1 Conflicts 
Between Sol'ereign Nalions, 19 hT:' kw. 487, 494 (1985). The Supreme Coun 
expressly acknowledged the validity of effects jurisdiction in Calder \'. Jones. 46S "C.S. 
783, 789 (1984). 
113. See generally REsr .... l"EME.'"T (SECO~1» OF FORElGS REu.t1O~S LA",' Of iHE {;~1TED 
Su ..m § 18 (1965). 
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jurisdiction is fully compatible with territorial limitations because 
one aspect of the entire criminal transaction occurs within the state' s 
borders. 
A state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
whose product causes injury within the state would seem consistent 
with effects jurisdiction for the same reason. The defendant's con-
duct outside the jurisdiction has caused injury within it: hence, a 
court is justified in asserting personal jurisdiction. Surely a state 
has an interest in protecting its residents from injuries directly 
caused by out-of-state actors. A state does not infringe on the 
sovereignty of another state or . otherwise impair federalism by exer-
cising its judicial power to protect an injured resident. 114 
Courts that have rejected the stream of commerce theory 
outright,115 including the O'Connor plurality, seem disingenuous for 
their failure to distinguish the facts of the cases before them from 
cases such as Gray, the result of which had been approved expressly 
in World-Wule Volkswagen. Alternatively, the Court could explic-
itly repudiate its dicta in that case, and in more recent ones such as 
Burger King, that have affirmed the theory's validity and seemingly 
rejected a territorial approach to personal jurisdiction. 
More troublesome are the implications of the O'Connor plural-
ity's view, should it ultimately prevail in the Supreme Court, for 
future products liability litigati.on1l6 and for litigation involving 
important areas of federal law and policy. In the products liability 
area, for example, the substantive tort law of most jurisdictions con-
templates that all entities within the distribution chain should be 
liable to a consumer who is injured by a defective product. One 
purpose of this extensive liability scheme is to bring to bear on those 
who manufacture and market consumer products the greatest possi-
ble pressure to make those products safe. Construing the purposeful 
availment requirement narrowly to exclude marketing conduct erects 
an important procedural hurdle to effective and efficient enforce-
114. But see Currie, supra note 78, at 549 (stating that "[ilt would be odd if in a federal 
system fa state] could DO( enter a judgment against a man who stands in Indiana firing a 
gun at people in Dlioois; the man ... -00 ships in food is in no different position"). 
115. See supra note 8. 
116. "The most ominous aspecr of the [O'Connor plurality's] opinion is that four 
Justices joined in the finding that Asahi did not have minimum contacts with California. 
Although none of the opinions say so directly, this means that jurisdiction over Asahi was 
DOt available in the California courts even on behalf of slain and mangled California 
residents." Weintraub. Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Do~71 the Tubes. 23 TEX. l'Tl 
LJ. 55, 66 (footnotes omitted). 
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ment of substantive tort policies by denying many litigants the 
opportunity to prosecute products liability claims in a single forum. 
The notion that indirect contacts with a state, such as Asahi' s 
contacts with California, are insufficient to support specific juris-
di~on invites multistate marketing schemes dependent upon 
brokers, "independent" distributors. and similar middlemen whose 
presence along the chain of distribution will effectively insulate 
those truly responsible for product defects from liability to those 
whom their products have injured. 117 Given the potentially serious 
impact of this view on the future development of state products 
liability law, and the certainty that this question will have to be 
resolved by the Supreme Court, it is unfortunate that the five other 
members of the Asalzi Court were unable to articulate a coherent 
explanation of why existing jurisdictional doctrine readily accom-
modates the stream of commerce theory. 
B. Justice Stevens: A Problematic View 
At least two federal appellate courts have taken the position that 
the stream of commerce theory does not justify the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction, at least when a very small number of the defen-
dant's products have been sold in a remote state. lIS Justice Stevens' 
concurring opinion appears to espouse a similar view in suggesting 
that the validity of the stream of commerce theory depends on a 
number of quantitative· factors which may vary from case to 
case. 119 This approach ascribes a fundamentally different meaning 
to purposeful availmenrthan is expressed in the Brennan plurality'S 
opinion. 120 
According to the Stevens view, whether or not a defendant's act 
of placing a product in the stream of commerce can be characterized 
as "purposeful direction" of his activities toward a particular state, 
seems to turn on the quantum of sales made within the jurisdiction 
in question relative to the defendant's total sales, the value of those 
sales, and the hazardous nature of the products involved, rather than 
117. See Uf. at 69-70. 
See Chung v. ~k~A Dev. Corp .. 783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1986): Dalmau v. Hughes 
Aircraft Co .• 781 E2d 9 {Ist Cir. 1986}; see also Max Daet\\-yler Corp. 10·. R. Meyer. 762 
F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1985) (three sales 1.1.ithin jurisdiction insufficient to support jurisdiction). 
118. Asahi. 107 S. Ct. at 1038 (Ste1o·ens. 1.. concurring in part and in judgment). 
119. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
120. Id. 
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the nature of the defendant's acts. 12l While this view has some 
appeal, it raises new problems. 
It may be that Justice Stevens' position is that the line between 
"foreseeability" and "expectation" must be drawn with reference 
to the number of the defendant's products that make their way into 
the state through marketing channels. Yet Justice Stevens' notion 
that "volume, value, and the hazardous character"122 of the defen-
dant's indirect sales within the forum state are all relevant to the 
purposeful availment question suggests something different-that 
quantitative factors bear on whether a defendant's acts constitute 
purposeful availment. That is, he would seemingly focus on the 
extent of the defendant's contacts Vrith the forum, rather than on the 
manner in which those contacts were created, to determine whether 
the defendant's acts constitute purposeful availment. This implies 
that Asahi would not have been amenable to suit in California if 
only one of its valves had been sold there and that particular valve 
caused an injury-even if Asahi actually knew this would occur. It 
also suggests that the retailer defendant in World-W'ule Volkswagen 
might have been held to have purposefully availed itself of the 
benefits of the Oklahoma market if the plaintiffs had shown that 
hundreds of automobiles sold by the retailer were regularly driven 
through Oklahoma. 
The difficulty with this analysis is that it confuses the narrow 
question of whether a defendant's acts constitute purposeful avail-
ment with the broader and fundamentally different question of 
whether a defendant's contacts are sufficient to support general 
jurisdiction. One can imagine a situation in which the flow of a 
defendant's products into a state via the stream of commerce is so 
steady and of such quantity that the defendant can be said to be 
doing business there, and, therefore, is amenable to jurisdiction in 
both related and unrelated lawsuits. . Quantitative factors such as 
those noted by Justice Stevens are undoubtedly relevant to this type 
of inquiry .123 It is difficult to understand, however, how such quan-
titative factors are relevant to whether the defendant's acts constitute 
purposeful availment except insofar as they serve as evidence that 
the defendant knew or should have known that his product would be 
12L [d.. 
122. See generally Helicopteros. 466 t:.s. 408 (1984): Beany v. Beech Aircraft Corp .. 
818 F.2d 370 (5th eir. 1981 •. 
123. :uahi. 107 S. Ct. at 1038 (Stevens. J .. concurring in pan and 1D judgment'. 
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used in a particular jurisdiction and might give rise to product-
related litigation there. 
A quantitative approach is problematic for another reason: it 
offers no guidance as to what level of interaction with the forum 
state counts as purposeful availment. In Asahi, Justice Stevens indi-
cated that he would be "inclined" to hold that "a regular course of 
dealing that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over 
a period of several years would constitute 'purposeful avail-
ment.' "124 This implies that at some reduced level the defendant's 
conduct cannot be considered purposeful. How much less, how-
ever, is not clear. Would indirect sales in the state of 100,000 units 
during a single year constitute purposeful availment? Would direct 
sales of 150 units in four consecutive years suffice? Would sales 
amounting to .0005 percent of defendant's total annual revenues? A 
quantitative treatment of the purposeful availment issue raises prac-
tical problems that make it impossible to decide specific cases on 
any principled basis. If the objective of personal jurisdiction rules 
is to provide • 'notice" to a defendant when his activities will subject 
him to a court's jurisdiction, then this ""quantitative" approach fails 
in its essential purpose. 
C. The Brennan Plurality: Hope for the Stream of Commerce 
Theory 
Of the three opinions rendered in Asahi, only Justice Brennan' s 
plurality opinion expresses unequivocal approval of the stream of 
commerce theory of personal jurisdiction. According to Justice 
Brennan. the theory is consistent with the Court's prior decisions on 
purposeful availment and with the underlying purposes of pro-
cedural due process. 12S In his view, a defendant whose product is 
marketed in a remote jurisdiction receives benefits from that juris-
diction irrespective of whether his marketing activity is direct or 
indirect. Moreover, when such a defendant is or should be aware 
that his product is being sold in a particular state, he likewise ought 
to know that a suit may be filed against him there if his product 
should cause injury. Thus, whether the purposeful availment 
124. Id. at 1035-3i lBrennan. J •• concurring in pan and in judgment). 
125. Indeed. inasmuch as the due process clause prorectS .. ·persons·. not 'defen-
dants: .. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shuns, 472 lJ.S. 797. 811 (985). one can argue that 
M1 permining a state coon to assert jurisdiction over stream of commerce defendants 
might in some circumstances violate the due process rights of the innocent victims. 
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requirement serves to protect state sovereignty, to ensure notice 
(and hence, fairness), or both, the requirement is satisfied in a 
typical stream of commerce case. 
Justice Brennan is surely correct. The stream of commerce the-
ory rests on the premise that it is not unfair to assert specific juris-
diction over a defendant who knows or should know that his product 
is being marketed in a remote jurisdiction. Such a defendant is on 
notice that his product may cause injury in that jurisdiction, and 
should be on notice that he may be "haled into court" there to 
defend a civil action arising from the use of his product. In vir-
tually all cases, the defendant has deliberately chosen a marketing 
scheme that contemplates distribution of his product within the 
remote jurisdiction. It has the power to prevent distribution there 
directly (by extracting appropriate contractual agreements .with his 
distributors) or indirectly (by dealing only with manufacturers or 
distributors who do not do business within jurisdictions where it 
does not wish to be sued). The defendant has enjoyed economic 
benefits flowing from the sales of his product within the state. In 
short, no matter how one conceives the purposes of procedural due 
process in the personal jurisdiction context, they are not offended 
when a state court uses the stream of commerce theory as a justifica-
tion for asserting person3I jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 
VI. Conclusion 
The stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction has 
coexisted peacefully with the notion of "purposeful availment" 
since at least 1961, when Gray was decided. It has been used to 
justify jurisdiction, almost exclusively, in specific jurisdiction cases 
by plaintiffs who have suffered serious bodily injury, property 
damage, or economic injury. The theory allows states to realize the 
objectives of their products liability laws and allocate liability 
among joint tortfeasors in a single proceeding held in a single 
forum. 
In light of the importance of the stream of commerce theory, 
the Supreme Court's failure to resolve the issue of its validity in 
Asahi is troubling. Those concerned about the future of products 
liability litigation can only hope that the Court will soon take steps 
to resolve the unfortunate ambiguities and uncertainties that are 
Asahi's legacy. 
